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For decades, the European Union (EU) has claimed to be a global champion 
of human rights and made many efforts accordingly both inside and outside the 
region. For many Europeans, linking human rights issues to internal and 
international trade has become as natural as linking the environment to trade. The 
death penalty is also a prominent human rights issue, and the EU calls for its 
universal abolishment. This study examines why and how the EU has connected 
the death penalty issue to its trade policy. Building upon the literature on issue 
linkages, this study categorizes the historical development of the linkage between 
the death penalty and trade in four different phases: recognition, integration, 
institutionalization, and expansion. It is argued that the linkage has been 
strengthened in terms of its “coerciveness” and “directness” over the past few 
decades. This study uses Graham Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model to 
explain how and to what extent the internal politics among European institutions, 
particularly between the European Parliament and the European Commission, have 
determined the ways in which the two otherwise separate issues have been linked. 
The European Parliament is the main advocate of such a linkage and has 
successfully induced the European Commission to promote the abolishment of the 
death penalty through its commercial power despite its earlier objection. This study 
claims that the consequence of the death penalty–trade linkage is the empowerment 
of the European Parliament vis-à-vis the European Commission. In each phase of 
the linkage development, the European Parliament has made explicit efforts to 
expand its formal and normative power by voicing strong opinions about the 
internal and external trade of which the European Commission is in charge. This 
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study concludes that the European Parliament, which stands as an advocate and 
defender of human rights, has successfully engaged itself in the trade issue area by 
linking the death penalty to trade and thus increased its influence at the expense of 
the European Commission.
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policy, death penalty, issue linkage.
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The strength of the European Union (EU) comes from its market size, which 
is the largest in the world, followed by China and the United States (European 
Commission 2014). The EU is indeed one of the main players in international trade, 
exerting global influence through means of commerce. However, what started as a 
means of commercial gain through the integration of European markets is no 
longer an inward-looking economic animal concerned only about the wealth and 
growth of Europe. It now promotes a vast array of noncommercial values, norms, 
and ideals beyond the European continent. The EU acts as a global defender of and 
progressive advocate for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. Since the 
1970s, the EU has attached so-called essential clauses to its international 
agreements to promote European human rights standards by other means. 
International trade is no exception (Bartels 2005). Human rights 
conditionalities are now included in almost all trade agreements concluded by the 
EU. However, among these human rights clauses, there lies a controversial issue: 
the death penalty. The EU has long defined the death penalty as a violation of
human rights and urged other countries to adopt a moratorium, if not a complete 
abolishment. The EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty state that the EU holds a 
２
“strong and unequivocal opposition to the death penalty in all circumstances.” ②
The EU has thus attempted to impose its position on others by linking the matter to 
its trade policy tools. Other things being equal, countries are more likely to comply 
with certain norms and rules when they are linked to commercial interests (Hafner-
Burton, 2005). Upon the legislation of Council Regulation (EC) no. 1236/2005, 
which prohibits the export of goods related to the death penalty, European policy to 
link the death penalty to trade became more explicit and legally binding. The EU 
has further strengthened its position to induce its trading partners to abolish the 
death penalty by linking the issue to generalized system of preferences (GSP)+ 
conditionalities and free trade agreements (FTAs).
While the EU effort is deemed noble, little is known about the motives behind 
such an issue linkage. In general, human rights clauses attached to trade are 
designed to eventually promote both human rights and trade. For instance, clauses 
that require the enhancement of labor rights or the betterment of human rights 
conditions in oppressive and unstable governments are implicitly or explicitly 
related to the benefits of the linkers as well as the linkees, such as guaranteeing a 
stable atmosphere for commerce and investment (Petersmann 2000 2005; Aaronson 
2007; Lee 2008). However, the death penalty issue lacks the consensual knowledge 
to be linked to trade and commerce, and it is only a recent development that the EU 
began to use the term “death penalty” in external relations (Manners 2002). In 
addition, the death penalty is viewed by many countries as a sovereign rather than 
human rights matter. Aside from denouncing the death penalty as uncivilized and 
undemocratic, unilaterally imposing so-called European values on death-penalty-
                                           
② Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, 
8416/13, 12 April 2013.
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retentionist countries is criticized as human rights imperialism (Reuters 19 April 
2018). While torture is an apparent violation of international law, capital 
punishment is not.③
There is growing literature on the EU influence on other countries in dealing 
with the death penalty issue (Hodgkinson 2000; Fawn 2001; O’Mahony 2001; 
Girling 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2005; Lerch and Schwellnus 2006; Schmidt 
2007; Neumayer 2008; Mathias 2013). Also, there is nascent scholarly attention to 
the EU position on the death penalty and/or essential clauses in relation to trade 
agreements (Stirling 1996; Alston et al. 1999; Horng 2003; Bartels 2005, 2012). 
However, little work exists that examines the death penalty issue from a linkage 
perspective. Extant studies often take a normative approach in explaining the EU 
advocacy for the abolishment of capital punishment (Manners 2002, 2006).
This study begins with the question of why the EU is eager to link the 
seemingly controversial and nonconsensual issue to trade and how this linkage 
practice has formed and grown over the three decades. The EU effort to link the 
death penalty to trade is a recent development, and the scope and intensity of such 
a linkage have evolved along with changes in the institutional power dynamics 
within the EU. To demonstrate the dynamic evolution process, this study develops 
a set of typologies inspired by the issue linkage literature, particularly the work of 
Giovanni Maggi (2015). With a pluralist viewpoint, this study conducts an in-depth 
case analysis of the internal politics among EU institutions that hold discrete 
institutional goals, interests, and powers. Graham Allison’s work on the 
bureaucratic politics model (Model III) offers a conceptual framework that guides 
                                           
③ Council of the European Union, EU Guidelines on the Death Penalty, 
8416/13, 12 April 2013.
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the causal analysis of the death penalty–trade linkage. It is argued that the unlikely 
linkage has resulted from explicit and intentional efforts by the European 
Parliament, which competes with the European Commission for a greater sphere of 
influence. From this perspective, the development of the death penalty–trade 
linkage is both the cause and the effect of the empowerment of the European 
Parliament. This study concludes that the European Parliament, which stands as an 
advocate and defender of human rights, has successfully engaged in the trade issue 
area by linking it to the death penalty issue and increased its influence within the 
EU accordingly. 
The remainder of this study unfolds in four sections. Section II presents an 
overview of the death penalty–trade linkage in the context of the European 
institutional and legal landscape and offers an analytical framework centered on 
issue linkage and the bureaucratic politics model. Section III categorizes the 
evolution of the death penalty–trade linkage in four distinct but related phases and 
analyzes how the bureaucratic politics between the European Parliament and the 
European Commission have determined the strength and scope of the linkage in 
each phase. Section IV summarizes the findings and outlines the future research 
agenda.
1.2. Trade and Human Rights Linkage
The concept of linking different agendas to trade agreements are hardly something 
new, and linkages come in various dimensions: environmental components, 
governance, and human resources management. Bringing normative spheres into 
commercial interests, the linkage between human rights and trade especially calls 
５
for deeper understanding due to its vastly distant nature, where one’s discourse is 
on deep natural law and the other on market economy discourses. Human rights by 
itself is normative in that it seeks protection of all individual human beings 
regardless of their position in the economic market (Voiculescu, 2013). 
The emergence of human rights considerations in trade began in the 70s, 
and more systemically and proactively became institutionalized into trade 
agreements from the 1990s as a part of ‘essential elements’. Monitoring and 
suspension clauses has been a method for the EU to promote human rights world-
wide through trade. These clauses in EU foreign policy are considered to have dual 
function both domestically and externally (Petersmann, 2015). Though there are 
contentions in whether they compete with WTO regulations as a form of 
protectionism in disguise, the European Union has actively tried to link normative 
matters to its trade policies. 
In general, the human rights clauses in trade encompass those in the 
‘International Bill of Rights’ as well as other global standards as the International 
Labor Organization. The forms in which human rights are incorporated into trade 
laws vary, which can be a ban on imported goods that undermine human rights
(such as child labor or torture), or directly assessing the human rights situations in 
third countries and urging them to change. Positive conditionalities are those that 
provide additional trade preferences such as reduced tariffs and access to EU
markets when human rights standards are met, and negative conditionalities refer to 
the withdrawal and elimination of trade preferences or imposition of sanctions
(Takács et al, 2013).
Within the human rights-trade linkage, labor related restrictions are 
especially notable. In the Generalized System of Preferences(GSP), regulations 
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included in 1994 contains clauses that would allow withdrawing preferences in 
times of forced labor. In 2001, the GSP regulation was revised to incorporate the 
Conventions of the ILO, and all the beneficiary countries would have to abide by 
the labor rights conventions included in as an annex to the regulation. There are 
cases where the EU actually did withdraw preferences from its beneficiaries, 
Belarus being one of them in 2007 due to the country not complying with ILO 
Convention obligations. In other cases, the EU also withdrew GSP+ preferences
from Sri Lanka in 2010 after the the systematic human rights violations enacted 
during the country’s civil war. In terms of child labor, the EP recently called for a 
legislation to impose restrictions on the imports of goods related to such (European 
Parliament 2018).
Other methods of incorporating human rights include export controls 
resulting from human rights violations. In 2016, the Commission’s proposal to 
recast the Dual-use Regulation (No 428/2009) banned the exports of cyber-
surveillance technologies that can lead to human rights violations in repressive 
governments. Also, EU’s regulation No 2368/2002 mandates certification of the 
Kimberley process in rough diamonds trade. Due to the human rights violations 
prevalent in the process, the EU banned rough diamond imports that are not 
certified of its origin. This goes further in the EU adopting the Conflict Mineral
Regulation(to be applied fully in 2021), which would ban trade in minerals that 
finance human rights abuses (European Parliament 2018).
1.3. Legal Backgrounds of the Death Penalty–Trade Linkage
７
Human rights law in Europe developed through the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the interpretations of the European Court of Justice 
(Manners 2002). During the negotiations for the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU, also referred to as the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992), the human rights issue 
became prominent, and member countries agreed to promote it through various 
means, including the EU enlargement conditionality clauses. To be admitted to the 
European Union, membership in the Council of Europe (CoE) is required (Steiker 
2002). The CoE adheres to Protocols 6 and 13 of the ECHR④, which all the EU 
members must ratify. Protocol no. 6 requires members to abolish the death penalty 
during peace times (since 1985), and no. 13 to implement total abolition, including 
during war times (since 2003). Also, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in 2000 stipulates an absolute ban on capital punishment for all circumstances, a 
binding regulation ratified by the 2008 Treaty of Lisbon. The TEU states in Article 
6 that the EU must adhere to and recognize the principles that are listed in the 
charter (Douglas-Scott 2011), which makes the abolition of the death penalty a 
prerequisite for new membership. During the European Union expansion period of 
2004 to 2007, new Eastern European members that had retained the death penalty 
abolished it accordingly, and no execution has taken place within the EU since 
1997.⑤  
The European Commission began including the “Essential Elements Clause” 
in trade agreements in 1992 as the principal way to promote the trade–human rights
                                           
④
Protocol 6 mentions the restriction of the death penalty in times of war, 
which all Council of Europe members have signed and ratified, except 
Russia. Protocol 13 stipulates the complete abolition of the death penalty at 
all times.
⑤
Article 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became legally binding 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. It states that no one shall be condemned to the 
death penalty or executed.
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nexus as required by the EU’s treaty obligations. The underlying logic of the EU 
commitment to human rights with its external relations is based on the Treaty of 
Lisbon Article 205, which states that the EU’s external policies must respect the 
principles of “democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles 
of equality and solidarity, and … the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law.” This opens up the possibility of promoting its core values, 
including the abolishment of the death penalty, through trade relations (Behrmann 
and Yorke 2013: 23-24).
As mentioned above, prominent avenue for the EU trade–human rights nexus
is the GSP and the GSP+ conditionalities. They function as an important instrument 
to promote and protect human rights in developing countries. The GSP+, an 
extension of the GSP, is a unilateral measure that grants countries that are extra 
vulnerable — in terms of their shortcomings on economic diversification and 
integration into global markets — duty-free access to the EU market. The main 
beneficiaries of the GSP+ include Pakistan and the Philippines. While both GSP 
and GSP+ countries have to comply with the human rights principles that are listed 
in the annex to the GSP regulations, GSP+ countries are obliged to ratify an 
additional 27 international conventions on human rights standards, including a 
regulation on the execution of the death penalty listed in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in order to be granted preferential status 
(Zamfir 2017a: 4). Beneficiary countries have little option but to ratify and comply 
with the conventions on human rights, labor rights, sustainable development, and 
good governance in order to maintain their status. 
In addition to GSP and GSP+ measures, FTAs with the EU also include the 
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consideration of human rights in the “sustainable development chapter” so that the 
EU can pursue sustainable economic, social, and environmental development in 
developing countries (Bartels 2012).⑥  In the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the 
principle of sustainable development in Article 9 is defined as “respect for all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental social 
rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and accountable 
governance are an integral part of sustainable development”. In 2006, EU members 
agreed to negotiate FTAs with developing Asian countries and made it clear that 
trade agreements include social and labor provisions to address human rights 
concerns (Aaronson 2007). During negotiation processes with retentionist countries 
such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, the death penalty issue is often raised 
to be addressed.
However, the most explicit and direct manifestation of the EU’s trade–death 
penalty linkage is enshrined in the EU Council Regulation of 2005, a legislation 
that bans the export of goods related to torture or capital punishment.⑦  This 
regulation was amended in 2011, in 2014, and finally in 2016 to address loopholes 
and to strengthen the regulations on a longer list of goods and products such as 
electric chairs and lethal drugs (Zamfir 2017b).⑧
                                           
⑥ Feedback and the way forward on improving the implementation and 
enforcement of the Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in EU free 
trade agreements (European Commission 2018).
⑦
Council Regulation (EC) no. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade 
in certain goods that could be used for capital punishment, torture, or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
⑧
The list includes drugs such as pentobarbital and sodium thiopental, 
which are the two types of anesthetics that the US depends on to carry out 
executions through lethal injection (Pilkington 2011).
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Chapter 2. Frameworks of Analysis
2.1. Frameworks of Issue Linkage
There is a deep and rich literature on the issue linkage. Among others, Ernst Haas 
(1980) identifies three different types of issue linkages: tactical, fragmented, and 
substantive. Knowledge and power are important determinants of linkage types. 
Tactical linkage takes place when the issues linked are not intellectually connected 
with each other, but when power — either inducive or coercive — plays a linking 
role between the two otherwise separate issues. A fragmented linkage occurs when 
the two parties have different views on the causal relationship between two issues, 
but when they decide to concur anyway. Knowledge about the connection is 
fragmented and dispersed between the parties. Finally, substantive linkage is 
induced by the intellectual coherence of issues, whereby knowledge is more 
consensual among actors than those with fragmented or tactical linkages. The more 
incoherent the knowledge is, the more political the issue linkages become, whereby 
the power held by one country either induces or coerces the other country to accept 
the knowledge base held by the powerful country even if the weaker one does not 
fully agree with it (Aggarwal 1998 2013). 
Building upon this linkage framework, Giovanni Maggi (2016) 
categorizes three types of issue linkages: enforcement, negotiation, and 
participation. Enforcement linkage refers to the linkage through which a violation 
of an agreement in one area can lead to a sanction in a different area. Negotiation 
linkage occurs when agreements in two different areas are negotiated jointly. 
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Participation linkage takes place when a threat of sanction in a certain area is used 
to encourage participation in other areas. In a trade agreement, this type of linkage 
usually comes in the form of certain clauses that require sanctions against the 
counterpart for not meeting the standards in non-trade areas such as the 
environment and human rights. Other things being equal, the two former linkage 
types are more “direct” in nature than the last.
Hafner-Burton (2005) shows how coercion can be a more effective 
instrument than persuasion in order to change the counterpart’s behavior through 
international agreements. She compares FTAs to human rights agreements to find 
that FTAs are a better way to bring about changes in human rights situations in 
developing countries. While persuasion alone cannot provide strong incentives to 
alter behaviors, coercion through trade — that is, trade sanction — can do better. If 
human rights issues are linked to high trade stakes, the cost may become too high 
for linkee countries to retain any repressive behaviors. 
The extant literature on issue linkage provides guidance for 
understanding why and how two seemingly distant issues are linked together. For 
the purpose of this study, Maggi’s framework is useful because it shows how the 
types of linkages can vary depending on how different issues are discussed and 
negotiated together: whether they are directly included in an agreement such as a 
sanction or as part of other deals. Hafner-Burton’s framework is also useful 
because it clearly illustrates how and to what extent the linkage of trade to the 
human rights issue in a bilateral trade agreement has a coercive effect on countries 
that otherwise would not have complied with human rights norms. 
As both “state sovereignty” and “human rights” are highly contested, 
we can reasonably say that there is no consensual knowledge about the linkage 
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between trade and the abolishment of the death penalty. To that extent, the trade–
death penalty linkage is tactical or fragmented at best. In other words, the EU’s 
weaker trading partners will be induced or coerced to accept death penalty 
provisions in their trade agreements with the EU if the latter insists that it must be 
so. 
It should also be noted that there was no consensual knowledge among 
different EU institutions. As mentioned above, the EU is not a unitary actor to the 
extent that different institutions, particularly the European Parliament and the 
European Commission as legislative and executive branches, respectively, have 
different institutional goals and missions. The trade–death penalty linkage issue is 
no exception. It began as a European Parliament initiative and the European 
Commission position was initially ambivalent, if not negative. 
This is what motivates this study. For the purpose of analysis, it is 
assumed that the negotiations between the EU and its trading partners in relation to 
the inclusion of death penalty provisions will be determined by EU preferences, 
which are not constant. This study strives to examine and portray the strategic 
interaction between the European Parliament (as a defender of human rights) and 
the European Commission (as an advocate of free trade) in the evolution and 
empowerment of the trade–death penalty linkage within EU internal politics and 
policy-making procedures that would eventually be reflected in trade agreements. 
This study assumes that the European Parliament has played the 
“linker” role, while the European Commission has played the “linkee”. In order to 
capture the historical evolution of the linkage within the EU context, this study also 
offers a modified linkage framework with a focus on the level of directness and 
coerciveness of the linkage. 
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The first dimension — the level of directness — examines the degree to 
which the two EU institutions perceive that trade agreements and the death penalty 
issue are directly connected. If the trade agreements concluded by the EU explicitly 
mention the death penalty issue or different agreements are negotiated jointly to 
include the language in clauses, it would be considered more direct. The second 
dimension is the level of obligation and coercion in relation to the implementations 
of the death penalty in partner countries. It is designed measure whether the linkage 
actually brings about abolishment or at least a moratorium. These two criteria 
generate four different categories. In Table 1 four different periods in the evolution 
of the trade–death penalty linkage within the EU context are assigned accordingly. 
The levels of directness and coerciveness are a function of the power and 
knowledge dynamics between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission. 
Based on the coerciveness–directness matrix, the historical 
development of the trade–death penalty linkage can be categorized into four 
distinct phases. This categorization, however, is in no way mutually exclusive or 
clear-cut, but rather has overlapping features in order to allow the following stage 
to take over some components of the preceding stage. The first phase can be
labeled as the recognition period: the EU began building up its European identity 
and norms by perceiving capital punishment as a violation of fundamental human 
rights. It covers the period of the 1980s to the 1990s, during which human rights 
discourses became prevalent in Europe. Yet there was no organized effort to link 
trade to the death penalty. During this period, the linkage, if any, was neither direct 
nor coercive. 
The second phase is referred to as the integration period, which 
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coincides with the EU enlargement process until the early 2000s. During this 
period, death penalty abolition became an integral part of new EU membership and 
thus the enlargement of the EU’s “integration” process. This period is characterized 
by a coercive but indirect linkage. The third stage is the institutionalization period, 
occurring around the time when the 2005 Council Regulation was enacted. The 
language of capital punishment became explicit and institutionalized in EU trade 
laws. The linkage in this phase is direct in nature but noncoercive. The last phase is 
dubbed the expansion period when the EU efforts to link capital punishment 
standards to trade expanded in bilateral agreements as well as in unilateral 
measures vis-à-vis a larger range of countries. This period coincides with the time 
when the game-changing Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007 and is marked by a 
significant increase in coerciveness and directness. 
Table 1. The Directness–Coerciveness Matrix and the Evolution of the Trade–
Death Penalty Linkage within the EU.
High Directness Low Directness
High
Coerciveness
Phase 4: Expansion Period Phase 2: Integration Period
Low Coerciveness




2.2. Bringing in the Allison Model III: Bureaucratic Politics 
A supplementary framework is needed to connect the internal politics within the 
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EU to the directness–coerciveness matrix laid out in the previous section. This 
section begins with an observation that there was hardly any consensual knowledge 
between the linker (the European Parliament) and the linkee (the European 
Commission) at the beginning. In the early stage, the linkage was tactical in nature 
to the extent that the Council was not persuaded by the Parliament’s logic that trade 
is, and should be, connected to the death penalty issue. Tactical linkages are 
“driven by an actor’s ability to offer sufficient resources — either threats or 
rewards — to induce others to accept something in which they have no real 
interest” (Haas, 2003: 256). Therefore, the persuasion mechanism of tactical 
linkages is inherently based on power. The objective of tactical linkages is also 
political in that the linker tries to obtain leverage over the other party. It was not 
until the onset of EU democratic deficiency becoming a major issue in the early 
2000s that the Commission finally realized its own real interest in upholding the 
“substantive” trade–death penalty linkage.
The European Parliament as a linker has attempted to increase its political 
influence, and the European Commission as a linkee has its own organizational 
interests to defend. Therefore, it is important to understand how such power 
dynamics between the two EU institutions have been played out and determined 
the EU-level position on the trade–death penalty linkage to be included in trade 
agreements. To argue that the linkage development and evolution process was not 
just a result of the EU’s noble cause for human rights, but rather a result of internal 
politics and power play, this study adopts the bureaucratic politics model by 
Allison (1971), which explains how actors with different preferences work together 
and compete with each other to increase their own power and sphere of influence. 
Power is defined as the ability to exert influence upon policy outcomes, which 
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include, in Allison’s (1969) terms, factors such as “formal authority, institutional 
backing, constituents and status that shape bargaining advantages.”
The bureaucratic politics model is grounded in the idea that policy 
decisions are an outcome of bargaining games between organizational actors within 
an institution, whose goals and interests do not necessarily coincide with the ones 
held by individual institutional actors. This is in contrast to Model I (rational
choice), in which an organization is regarded as a unitary actor that always makes 
rational decisions. According to Allison (1971: 255), in Model III, “outcomes are 
formed and deformed by the interactions and competing preferences” and 
government actions are a consequence of “compromise, coalition, competition” 
amongst players at different hierarchical and political positions. Separate 
judgements, preferences, goals, and maneuvers are held by the principal players, 
and the perceptions and priorities of the entities are largely shaped by their 
hierarchical positions. The decisions have consequences for each actor’s 
“organizational stakes”, and the players who are engaged in the decision-making 
process act in order to increase their own organizational turf and advance the 
orientations that they have. 
In the case of the EU, actions and decisions are not made by a single actor 
or by members who share the same goals, but are outcomes of separate institutions 
competing with one another. The EU’s policy-making process involves three major 
players: the European Council, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament. This study focuses mainly on the latter two institutions. The political 
dynamics between these two institutions in their effort to advance their own 
institutional preferences for or against the trade–death penalty linkage are mostly 
absent in the existing literature and thus deserve more attention from the academic 
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community. 
To briefly introduce the preferences of each institution, the Commission
stands for material interests through free and unrestricted trade. In contrast, the 
European Parliament stands for normative core values: openness and democracy 
(Mckenzie and Meissner 2016). In the following section, the development of the 
coupling process will be further elaborated in terms of how much more coercive 
and direct the linkages have become over the course of years.
The European Parliament was the first EU institution that started engaging 
in the abolitionist movement in the 1980s (European Parliamentary Research
Service 2017) and has been an active advocate of worldwide eradication of the 
death penalty ever since. In 1980 the Parliament adopted the first resolution, which 
strongly voiced a call for abolition within the EEC. It has adopted a series of 
legislative resolutions on human rights and the death penalty in relation to less 
developed countries that retain the death penalty and has constantly brought the 
issue to the EU agenda. Since the mid-1990s, the Parliament has adopted more than 
30 resolutions on capital punishment in third states (Vutz 2010). Only in recent 
decades has it made differences in the real policy world. 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the “co-decision procedure” in 
legislation pertaining to some important areas and thus empowered the 
Parliament’s legislative rights within the EU. However, agreements under Article 
133⑨ explicitly excluded important trade agreements from the list that require the 
Parliament’s assent (Rosén 2016). Previously, the Single European Act of 1986 
clarified the Parliament’s role in the legislative procedure to cooperate with other 
                                           
⑨ It states that “the Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for 
implementing the common commercial policy.”
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EU institutions and mandated the Parliament to assent to accession and association 
treaties. The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam expanded areas for which the Parliament 
holds assenting powers, with the goal of placing the Parliament on the same 
institutional level of the European Commission and the European Council. The 
Parliament was also authorized to approve the appointment of the President of the 
Commission, thus becoming a “constitutional agenda setter” in the EU context 
(Hix 2002). In its struggle for power, the Parliament effectively took advantage of 
the loopholes in the co-decision system under the Maastricht Treaty by threatening 
not to cooperate with other institutions. The Parliament also made full use of the 
2001 Treaty of Nice, which allows the Parliament to formally assent to the 
accession of new EU members (European Parliament 2018). 
For the European Parliament, the most important momentum and 
opportunity to push forward human rights using the EU’s commercial power came 
with the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon (Beke et al. 2014). The Treaty of Lisbon enabled 
the Parliament to play a significant role in trade affairs by mandating all essential 
EU trade policies to go through the Parliament before they are adopted by the 
European Council. Also, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) Article 207 gives the Parliament the power to legislate matters concerning 
common commercial policy “in the context of the principles and objectives of the 
Union’s external action.” TEU Article 21 also stipulates that these principles and 
objectives include the promotion of compliance with human rights legislation 
(Bartels 2014: 22). The Treaty of Lisbon mandates the Commission to report to the 
Parliament on trade negotiations at all stages (Woolcock 2007; Van den Putte et al. 
2014). As a result, the Parliament not only holds consenting power in trade 
agreements, but also has the agenda-setting power to include human rights 
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conditionality in trade agreements. While the Commission initiates trade policy 
objectives and negotiates agreements, the Parliament exercises co-decision power 
by approving related legislations. This veers the Parliament towards a more 
protectionist stance than other EU institutions (Rosén 2017).
The European Commission forms the executive branch of the EU, 
representing the interests of the European Union as a whole. Inside the European 
Union, the relationship between the European Commission and the European 
Parliament is more or less competitive and disagreeable, especially when it comes 
to trade, the consequences of which directly affect a large number of European 
citizens (Dur and Zimmerman 2007). Along with the European Council, the 
European Commission operates on a more liberal and free trade spectrum than its 
legislative counterpart and works in a more technocratic manner rather than 
normative (Michailidou and Trenz 2013). Also, the Commission tends to regard 
trade sanctions as a last resort to promoting human right clauses, while believing 
that an exercise of threat alone can induce changed behaviors in its trading partners 
(Beke 2014). In contrast, through its human rights campaign, the European 
Parliament has not only gained a strong normative foothold in the global arena but 
also scored political credit within the EU as a gatekeeper of European core values. 
It is not a coincidence that the European Council has been drawn into the trade–
death penalty linkage despite its concerns about the trade diversion effect.
2.3 The Death Penalty and the European Parliament 
Then there is the question of why the death penalty among other issues was so
important to the European Parliament in expanding its sphere of influence. The 
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matter was clear cut and had little room for dispute when it came to determining its
violation compared to other human rights issues. It was execution or no execution,
and abolition or no abolition. In fact, most of the human rights clauses attached to 
EU’s external trade preferences were vaguely identified and criticized for its 
unclear use and mere existence as soft law with no visible obligation (Borlini 2018). 
Furthermore, the Parliament used this to ward off any countries that
threatened its position in the process of the EU integration and enlargement. This is 
especially evident in the Parliament’s stance towards the accession of Turkey. Since 
the negotiations for Turkey’s accession began in the 1980s, the Parliament voiced a 
strong opinion against membership. The argument was that Turkey did not meet 
EU accession criteria in human rights, where death penalty retention was most 
evident. Although Turkey did abolish the death penalty to meet the requirements, 
the EP still was not fond of the country’s membership. Even recently in 2016, the 
EP even voted to suspend Turkey’s membership negotiations after President 
Erdogan came to power, who had the intention to reinstate the death penalty
(Independent 2016). While the EU’s position may have come from democratic and 
human rights concerns, Turkey’s Islamic backgrounds may have factored in, and 
more importantly, the EP was in fear of Turkey dominating the Parliament in its 
decisions. Since the number of MEPs were representative of the domestic
population, Turkey would have the second-highest number of members which
would greatly influence EU’s policy decisions (The Economist, 2017).
Lastly, the Parliament was aware that the Commission shared a common 
interest in framing the EU in the global society as a normative actor, differentiating 
itself from the major powers in trade as Russia, China, and especially the United 
States, one of the few developed countries that retained and actively executed the 
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death penalty. The EP, along with EC was seeking for EU’s place in the
‘abolitionist vanguard’ to distinct its international identity to these super actors 
(Manners, 2002). While the EU never expected the US and China to abandon the 
death penalty execution, it at least had the intention to establish its stance in the 
global arena as a moral leader, on the other hand condemning the “super 
executioners’ for their undemocratic, uncivil behaviors (Demleitner, 2002). 
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Chapter 3. Analyzing the Evolution of the Trade-
Death Penalty Linkage
3.1. Phase 1: Integration (from the 1990s to the early 2000s)
The integration period is characterized by the coerciveness and indirectness of the 
issue linkage. During the EU enlargement process and assessments for EU 
membership, all applicant states had to abolish the death penalty to gain 
membership and the corresponding trade benefits. To enjoy access to the integrated 
European market, applicant states were asked to abolish the death penalty in 
accordance with the EU protocols and accession criteria with respect to human 
rights standards, including the death penalty. ⑩ The trade benefits, however, were 
coupled rather loosely with the accession criteria. Human rights criteria stipulating 
the abolition of the death penalty were not directly linked to trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, the ECHR and the charter protocols have a binding, coercive effect 
on the behavior of individual states. Applicants for new membership had no option 
but to abolish the death penalty for accession (European Parliament 1999). Unlike 
the founding members of the European Economic Community (ECC) and the EU,
new members who joined as part of the European Union enlargement since the 
early 2000s (application made in the 1990s) had to comply with new requirements 
on human rights conditionality for accession. This accession conditionality was not 
                                           
⑩
In the common provisions of the TEU and principles of the European 
Community Treaty as conditions for accession, a declaration annexed to the 
Final Act urges and/or requires states’ abolition of the death penalty.
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directly discussed in joint trade negotiations.⑪  
The European Parliament’s interest in linking the death penalty issue to 
EU trade was motivated not solely by a noble cause to promote human rights but 
also by a secular goal to obtain normative power within EU politics, particularly in 
relation to the European Commission. The EU enlargement process starting in the 
early 1990s helped the Parliament to forge a new, proactive organizational identity 
about its role and place within the EU, especially with respect to the Association 
Agreements (The European Parliament 2001). The Parliament called for a more 
democratic input to the accession process as well as for more solid measures for 
civil society issues. The between-the-lines intention was to check and balance 
against the European Commission, which was in charge of the enlargement 
process.⑫  
Against this backdrop, parliamentary resolutions on the death penalty 
issue were adopted in 1992, urging all members of the EU to ratify Protocol 6 of 
the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as ICCPR’s 
                                           
⑪ The coerciveness of the linkage can be illustrated by the fact that most 
Eastern European countries with newly earned EU membership indeed 
abolished the death penalty. Cyprus, Poland, and Malta, for instance, gained 
EU membership in 2004 as part of the EU enlargement process. For Cyprus, 
its membership in the CoE began in 1961, and for Poland it was 1991. 
However, they ratified Protocol no. 6 of the ECHR only in 2000, which 
indicates that the abolition of the death penalty was not a response to 
joining the CoE but rather to joining the European Union (Manners 2002). 
Bulgaria applied for membership in 1995, abolished the death penalty in 
1998, and gained membership in 2007. In the meantime, Turkey was one of 
the most controversial countries for new membership. It abolished the death 
penalty in 2004 in an effort to facilitate its accession to the EU, but has 
been constantly reminded by the European Parliament that there are other 
human rights concerns remaining to be addressed (Özbudun 2007).
⑫
As will be discussed below, however, it was not until the 2001 Treaty of 
Nice that the Parliament was given consenting power with regard to the 
accession of new members.
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Second Optional Protocol, which requires signatories to abolish the death penalty 
in peace times (Behrmann and Yorke 2013). Parliament efforts came to fruition 
when it became a prerequisite for new membership to abolish or pledge to abolish 
the death penalty. During this stage, however, the linkage was not directly directed 
at trade negotiations within Europe. The European Commission still viewed the 
Parliament as an immature, irresponsible actor in dealing with EU trade (Rosén 
2016). Even during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations, the Commission was not 
very concerned about an “empowered” European Parliament due to the 
Parliament’s lack of competence (Groen and Niemann 2011).
The Parliament was able to exercise rhetorical and normative power in 
regard to human rights concerns, the result of which was the inclusion of the death 
penalty in the accession criteria. However, its influence on trade agreements was 
extremely limited due to the lack of formal consenting power on trade issues. The 
European Commission successfully guarded its trading negotiation authority in the 
face of growing normative challenge by the Parliament (Rosén 2016).
3.2. Phase II: Institutionalization (the mid-2000s)
During this period, the Parliament’s role in coupling human rights, especially the 
death penalty, with trade became more vital to its position as the source of the EU’s 
normative power. The Parliament executed this by issuing a number of 
parliamentary resolutions to pressure the European Commission. For the 
Parliament, the Constitution Treaty of 2002 marked an important momentum for 
external trade policies. The Parliament had a significant influence on the treaty and 
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emphasized its role as a constitutional agenda setter (Hix 2002). The Parliament 
was also influential in creating the Legislative Council, a single council to account 
for taking legislative decisions to the public, which reflected its calls for enhanced 
transparency and simplicity in the EU legislative process (Beach 2007). Building 
upon this, the INTA (European Parliament Committee on International Trade) was 
created in 2004, a committee in the Parliament responsible for implementing and 
monitoring EU external policies. In the same year, the Parliament Subcommittee on 
Human Rights (DROI) was reconstituted. Regarding the death penalty matter, the 
EP issued a regulation.
Since the Council Regulation of 2005 (EC no. 1236/2005), EU trade 
regulations and their linkage to capital punishment have become much more 
institutionalized than before and expanded outside the boundaries of the European 
continent. The Council Regulation of 2005 was the start of a direct and explicit 
form of law connecting trade to the death penalty. The protocol explicitly regulates 
“trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture, or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”⑬  Trade became a 
more direct instrument to influence the practice of capital punishment among the 
EU’s trading partners. However, the EU’s trading partners were not coerced into 
abolishing or declaring a moratorium on the death penalty. Compared to the 
previous phase, during which the outcome of the linkage resulted in the actual
abolition of the death penalty, the trade regulation itself was not effectively 
                                           
⑬ On 3 October 2001, the Parliament adopted a resolution urging the 
Commission to prohibit European firms from exporting “inherently cruel, 
inhuman or degrading” police and security equipment. In accordance with 
the resolutions, the Commission legislated a regulation, but the Parliament 
did not have consenting power to approve it. The legislation turned out to 
contain loopholes (Zamfir 2017b).
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enforced during this phase. It was the United States that became an unintended 
target, as the regulation prohibited European pharmaceutical companies from 
exporting certain anesthetic drugs used for lethal injections, thus slowing down 
executions in some states such as Ohio, North Dakota, and Texas (The Guardian 20 
December 2011; The Atlantic 18 February 2014). 
The question of why the Commission decided to concur with the 
Parliament on the trade–death penalty linkage remains. The answer can be found in 
the Commission’s effort to address the institution’s “democratic deficit” (Rosén 
2016: 420). Since the Amsterdam negotiations had started in 1997, the deficiency
of the EU’s democratic legitimacy in trade policies was accounted for by the 
Commission’s lack of transparency. The Commission, which holds immense 
bureaucratic power in proposing legislation as well as negotiating trade agreements, 
is considered the most undemocratic of the three pillars of the EU (Jacobs 2003: 3–
4). 
That being said, strengthening the power of the Parliament, the only 
democratically elected body despite the low turnout rate, was a way to enhance the 
overall democratic legitimacy of the EU. The Parliament successfully framed the 
issue in its own favor. By the early 2000s, trade policies became more sensitive to 
“politically correct” issues, including human rights (Rosén 2016: 418–421). 
The rise of parliamentary power within the EU vis-à-vis trade issues was 
caused by the Parliament’s active campaign for human rights. At the same time, the 
European Commission made concessions to the Parliament because the former was 
well aware that the legitimacy deficit in trade policy-making process would
eventually backfire on the Commission. The Parliament’s rhetoric as the champion 
of European values (and its naming and shaming strategy) was too powerful for the 
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Commission to ignore completely (Yan 2015). It is notable that the Parliament 
exercised its “soft power” through resolutions, committee hearings, opinions, and 
questions to the Commission (Rittberger 2012). The Commission, for fear of being 
shamed and named as illegitimate and unethical, eventually made a concession —
that is, linking trade policies with the death penalty — to the Parliament (Rosén 
2017). Still, due to the lack of formal consenting power on EU trade policy, the EP 
remained only a normative power in legislation, and regulation contained 
numerous loopholes and limitations that the EP later had to identify.
3.2. Phase III: Expansion (from the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon to 
August 2018)
After the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Parliament was vested with legislative 
powers in all EU common commercial policies (CCPs), becoming one of the 
vertexes in the new triangular political structure (Yan 2015). The EP now not only 
holds normative and consultative power regarding trade issues, but also has the 
formal power of legislation, thus enabling it to implement human rights agendas 
more effectively through trade agreements. Also noting the internal administration 
of the EP, the INTA secretariat was doubled in size within five years after its 
establishment in 2004, with its administrative and technical services significantly 
strengthened (Bendini 2015). 
The GSP+ status awarded to developing countries is now closely 
monitored by the European Parliament, which ensures that human rights 
conditionality clauses are properly enforced in beneficiary states, including the 
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death penalty. For the first time in decades, the INTA proposed amendments in 
2011 to the GSP scheme and its conditions of withdrawal from preferences. It also 
played an essential role in setting the duration of GSP regulations, and most of the 
proposed amendments were reflected in the regulations (Zamfir 2017b). The EP 
steps into all processes of FTA negotiations regarding the matter of human rights 
achievements, as in the case of the Korea–EU FTA during which the EP raised the 
issue of death penalty retention in South Korea and formally questioned the 
Commission’s negotiation process. 
During this phase, the EU’s efforts were guided by the EP’s leading role in the 
amendment of Council Regulation no. 2005 and the EP’s active role in 
implementing and attaching death penalty issues to GSP+ conditions as well as 
FTAs. With regards to regulations on banning trade in goods related to the death 
penalty, the Council Regulation of 2005 was revised in 2011 and in 2014, and it 
was newly adopted in 2016 (Regulation (EU) 2016/2134) to tighten trade-related 
measures. In the amendment of (EC) no. 1236/2005, the INTA played a major role 
by proposing and sealing stricter regulations on the export of death-penalty-related 
products. In 2010, the EP began pressuring the Commission to initiate substantial 
changes in the law by adopting a resolution that eventually compelled the 
Commission to propose new drafts (Zamfir 2017b).⑭  A resolution was once 
again adopted in 2014, which reiterated its earlier calls to member states.⑮  The 
EP was successful in forming a coalition with other interest groups, most notably 
                                           
⑭ 2010/2685(RSP): resolution on the implementation of Council Regulation 
(EC) no. 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods that could be used for 
capital punishment, torture, or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment.
⑮ European Parliament resolution of 11 March 2014 on the eradication of 
torture in the world (2013/2169(INI)).
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Amnesty International and the Omega Research Foundation, and urged the 
Commission to adopt new proposals. This coalition identified specific loopholes in 
the 2005 regulations. The original regulations were amended in 2011 and again in 
2014. The 2014 amendment, in particular, was driven by the INTA. The new 
regulations were adopted both by the Parliament and the Council thanks to the EP’s 
consenting power newly given by the Treaty of Lisbon.
With these new regulations in place, the EU also began targeting Asian 
developing countries through GSP+ and other Asian industrialized countries such 
as South Korea, Japan, and Singapore through FTAs. The EU is now more openly 
and forcibly using trade as a carrot and stick to encourage respect for human rights 
and the abolishment of the death penalty in these countries. EU trading partners are 
now more coercively reminded of the human rights obligations than in Phase 3, 
although not as much as in Phase 2. In line with the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its protocols, the GSP+ conditionalities 
require beneficiary countries to abide by human rights obligations, including the 
abolition of the death penalty, to maintain GSP+ status and preferential access to 
the European market (Zamfir 2017b). Pakistan, for instance, is on the verge of 
preference withdrawal for executing prisoners for crimes that are not categorized as 
“most serious”, thereby breaching the ICCPR protocols. The EP has expressed 
concerns and warned Pakistan that it could imperil its GSP+ status (The Express 
Tribune 18 June 2017). The Philippine government is also facing the threat vis-à-
vis its GSP+ status. When the House of Representatives of the Philippines 
approved a bill to reinstate the death penalty, the EU warned of a setback in terms 
of preferences (Reuters 19 April 2018).
More highly developed Asian countries also face pressure and the threat 
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of withdrawal of preferential treatment. For instance, under pressure from the 
European Parliament, South Korea’s Ministry of Justice submitted a pact of non-
application of capital punishment when negotiating an extradition agreement with 
the EU in 2008. This was a move to appease the European Parliament in the middle 
of an FTA negotiation with the EU, which started in 2007 (Views and News 23 
March 2010).16  In fact, during the negotiation process the Parliament adopted a 
resolution asking the Korean National Assembly to abolish the death penalty by 
2010, just before the FTA would come into effect in 2011.17
Why was the otherwise competitive European Commission so eager to 
cooperate on the EP’s commitment to link trade to human rights, more specifically 
to the death penalty? It is notable that the Commission itself supported and 
recognized the Parliament’s power increase during EU Conventions (Rosén 2016). 
While this can be attributed to the lack of democratic legitimacy, a more important 
reason lies in the fact that the EP now holds greater political and formal power. In 
the 2014 EU elections, Eurosceptic factions became a salient political influence. 
They were not favorable to the free trade idea advocated by the Commission. On 
top of that, the Parliament exercised its veto power by rejecting the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in 2012. Its rationale was based on 
                                           
16
The case of Singapore is an exception. Singapore “leads the world in 
executions, putting to death more people than Saudi Arabia, China and 
Sierra Leone on a per capita basis” (CNN 2004). However, the EU remained 
curiously silent when negotiating an FTA with the city state. The 
Singaporean government was unwilling to compromise its position on the 
death penalty matter and the EU exercised no pressure at all.
17 The case of Singapore is an exception. Singapore “leads the world in 
executions, putting to death more people than Saudi Arabia, China and 
Sierra Leone on a per capita basis” (CNN 2004). However, the EU remained 
curiously silent when negotiating an FTA with the city state. The 
Singaporean government was unwilling to compromise its position on the 
death penalty matter and the EU exercised no pressure at all.
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human rights concerns, stating that the agreement could threaten citizen liberties. 
This indicates that parliamentary consent was substantial, making the Commission 
become much more aware of the existence of the EP as a legitimate governing 
body (Beke 2014; Bendini 2015). Against this political backdrop, the Commission 
had no choice but to support the Parliament. 
The EP has indeed made conscious efforts to link the death penalty issue 
to EU trade policy, thereby expanding its policy turf and interests. This has in turn 
empowered its status within European bureaucratic politics. In contrast, the 
Commission’s policy autonomy has been greatly reduced. With the democratic 
legitimacy issue, however, it is in the Commission’s best interests to cooperate with 
the Parliament. Most importantly, the Parliament now has both “hard” and “soft” 
powers, which is a clear departure from Phase 3. It is also notable that the 
Parliament’s promotion of the linkage was not only driven by a noble cause but
also by its own institutional and political interests. This is especially well portrayed 
by the EU–Singapore FTA (EUS FTA) negotiations during which the Parliament 
was not active in pushing forward the linkage. This was because the Parliament did 
not consider the EUSFTA as a means and opportunity to expand its political 
influence within the European Union (Mckenzie and Meissner 2016).
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Chapter 4. Conclusion
The unfolding of the power politics within European institutions is truly puzzling 
in relation to the linkage between trade and the death penalty. This study examined 
why and how the coupling between the two otherwise separate issues — the death 
penalty and trade — has been strengthened in the European Union in terms of 
coerciveness and directness. By analyzing the interplay between the European 
Parliament and the European Commission with a focus on their institutional and 
political interests, this study showed that the Parliament has successfully advanced 
and expanded its power, both soft and hard, while advocating the high value of 
human rights, including the abolishment of the death penalty.
The significance and implications of this study are four-fold. First, the 
European Union is not a unitary actor. The pluralistic approach of this study reveals 
that the trade–death penalty linkage is an outcome of competition between rival
institutions. It is notable that the development of the linkage between trade and the 
death penalty has been made possible by the European Parliament’s constant efforts
at expanding its sphere of influence within the EU. Democratic legitimacy is one of 
the most important assets for the Parliament in waging a contest for power. The 
Commission now accepts and promotes the trade–death penalty linkage, not 
because there is consensual knowledge about the linkage, but because it had no 
other options but to follow the Parliament’s lead given the Commission’s lack of 
democratic legitimacy in the trade policy-making processes. 
Second, the linkage between trade and the death penalty inside and 
outside the European Union has not emerged in a linear and progressive manner. In 
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Phase 2, when the issue linkage began to develop through the EU accession criteria, 
the European Parliament held neither leadership nor normative power and its role 
was thus limited. In Phase 3, however, the Parliament was granted significant 
normative power thanks to the prevalence of the EU’s democratic deficit agenda. 
Using its new power, the Parliament explicitly institutionalized the issue linkage 
within European trade law. Lastly, in Phase 4, the European Parliament earned the 
power of co-legislation and co-decision with the European Commission in the trade 
issue area and exercised its power to mandate the Commission to link the death 
penalty to GSP+ conditionalities as well as FTA negotiations. 
Third, it is remarkable that the European Union has become an advocate 
of worldwide death penalty eradication, going so far as to induce its trading 
partners to follow in its footsteps by using the carrot and stick. Although the 
linkage is likely to be strengthened as long as the European Parliament maintains 
its hard-earned powers, both soft and hard, there is no consensual knowledge about 
the linkage, not only within the European Union but also among its trading partners. 
Although the linkage process is partly driven by normative concerns, it was power 
politics that eventually led to policy equilibrium, at least within the European 
Union. That said, the trade–death penalty issue will remain controversial and 
complex. 
Fourth and finally, this study shows the fruitful results of combining and 
blending two otherwise separate literatures: the issue linkage framework and the 
bureaucratic politics model. Such a conceptual linkage has allowed this study to 
conduct a more systematically staged analysis of the evolution of the trade–death 
penalty linkage, which itself holds an ambivalent, if not contradictory, position 
within human rights concerns. The issue linkage was “tactical” to the extent that 
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there was no consensus between the linker (the Parliament) and the linkee (the 
Commission) from the very beginning. However, the linkage did not fail because 
of the power play between the two institutions in favor of the former.
３５
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유럽연합(European Union)은 그 기원이 경제공동체이지만, 오늘날 세계
인권의 수호자로서 자리매김하고 있다. EU는 여러 국제관계를 통해 전
세계적으로 유럽의 인권 규범을 전파하고자 노력하고 있으며, 무역도
예외는 아니다. 본 논문에서는 이러한 EU 인권규범과 통상의 연계
가운데 두드러진 이슈로 사형제를 살펴본다. EU는 사형제의 폐지를 인권
보호의 차원에서 강력하게 주장하고 있으며, 2005년에는 명시적으로
사형제와 관련된 물품의 유럽 외 수출을 법률로 금한 바 있다. 
이슈연계라는 측면에서 본 논문은 사형제와 통상의 연계가 어떻게
발전되어 왔는가를 시기별로 분류하며, 그 원인으로 앨리슨(1971)의
관료정치 모형(Model III)을 들어 EU조직들 간의 정치행태를 이해한다. 
이 논문은 유럽의회(European Parliament)가 사형제과 무역을 연결하려는
링커(linker)로서 어떻게 유럽집행위원회(European Commission)를 설득하여
효과적으로 이슈연계를 강화했는가 살펴봄으로써, 그것이 유럽의회의
EU 내 입지 강화의 결과와 원인으로 작용했다는 점을 밝힌다.
핵심어: 유럽연합, 유럽의회, 유럽집행위원회, 무역정책, 사형제, 
이슈연계
